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The Use of Secret Algorithms to Combat 
Social Fraud in Belgium* 
Elise Degrave 
(Professor at the University of Namur - Director of Research at the Namur Digital Institute 
NADI/CRIDS) 
ABSTRACT  Since the nineties, digital administration in Belgium has been built according to an interesting and 
novel model of data decentralisation within the State. The aim is to protect the privacy of citizens, as soon as the 
databases are set up. This model therefore embodies the concept of "privacy by design" since then enshrined by 
the RGPD. Nevertheless, certain tools and practices that have appeared more recently are cause for concern. They 
seem to destroy the protection of privacy initially organized. In this study, we focus on the OASIS tool, a 
datawarehouse to which datamatching and datamining techniques are applied to fight against social fraud. The law 
that seems to frame this tool was adopted very late and is unclear. The information available about OASIS is 
scarce, even when explicitly requested from the administration. However, this tool makes it possible to collect a 
large amount of data about many citizens for a very broad purpose, the fight against fraud. There are reasonable 
grounds for concern that the requirements of legality, transparency and control, which are essential in a 
democratic state that respects human rights, are not being met in this area. Furthermore, this study highlights the 
similarities between OASIS and the SYRI tool in the Netherlands. Recently, a decision of the Hague Court recently 
criticised SYRI by ordering that it should no longer be used, which further reinforces the need to pay close 
attention to OASIS in Belgium. 
1. Introduction 
In Belgium, the electronic administration, 
also known as “e-government”, is based on a 
very particular structure: the networking of 
administrations with the aim of facilitating the 
exchange of citizens’ personal data. This model 
is guided by two objectives: on the one hand, 
administrative simplification and, on the other 
hand, the protection of privacy (par. 1).  
This e-government model makes it possible to 
implement tools and practices to simplify 
administrative procedures, but also to strengthen 
the monitoring of citizens’ compliance with the 
rules. In this study, a monitoring tool used to 
fight social fraud will be of particular interest: 
OASIS. This tool seems to be hidden by the 
state. However, it raises many constitutional 
questions highlighting the delicate balance 
between administrative efficiency and the 
protection of fundamental rights (par. 2). This is 
also what the Dutch judiciary has recently 
observed with regard to an anti-fraud intelligence 
tool, SYRI, which has many similarities with 
OASIS (par. 3). 
2. The Belgian e-government model between 
administrative simplification and privacy 
protection 
At the basis of the Belgian e-government and 
its particular structure, which will be analysed 
below, there are two strong objectives: 
administrative simplification and protection of 
privacy. 
2.1. The objectives of administrative 
simplification and protection of privacy 
2.1.1. Administrative simplification 
For a long time, public institutions have 
worked in a compartmentalised manner, each 
independently of the other. They collected from 
citizens the information they needed to carry out 
their own tasks and did not share it afterwards. It 
can thus be said that the administration was 
structured “in silos”.  
This was a waste of time and money for the 
administration, which had to contact each person 
for each piece of information needed, wait for 
their reply, possibly asking for clarification, but 
also for the citizen who had to communicate the 
same information many times to the institutions 
managing a file about him or her, to carry out 
administrative procedures that involved 
identifying the competent administration, 
travelling, keeping to strict timetables and being 
patient in the queues. 
With the advent of technology, we can see 
that administrations can now collaborate 
effectively. Administrative simplification 
becomes possible. There is now a desire to 
encourage “synergies between the various 
departments and levels of government”1, with the 
aim of simplifying administrative procedures.  
Such collaboration facilitates the work of 
administrations, which can easily and quickly 
obtain the data they need to carry out their tasks.  
Furthermore, technology makes it possible to 
 
* Article submitted to double-blind peer review. 
1 Commission for the Protection of Privacy (hereinafter 
“OPC”), Opinion No. 41/2008 of 17 December 2008 on a 
request for an opinion on the preliminary draft law on the 
institution and organization of a Federal Service Integrator, 
No. 5. 
ISBN 978-88-255-3896-0 – DOI 10.4399/978882553896015 
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 reduce the administrative burden on citizens by 
not having to ask them repeatedly for 
information they have previously provided and 
which is already stored in a government 
database.  
From this comes the consecration of a new 
principle in the administration, the principle of 
single data collection. This principle consists in 
asking citizens for information about themselves 
only once, unlike in the past, when individuals 
had to repeatedly provide the same data to each 
administration they were in contact with. In other 
words, nowadays, as soon as the citizen has 
provided a certain type of information to one 
administration, the other administrations cannot 
ask for it again.  
Single data collection and the necessary re-
use of data between administrations are not just 
“good practice”. These requirements are 
contained in legal obligations, in particular a law 
of 5 May 2014 imposing all federal departments 
single data collection2. 
2.1.2. Protection of privacy 
Organising the exchange of personal data 
between administrations increased the risks that 
the protection of citizens’ privacy would be 
threatened by abuses in the use of their data. For 
this reason, a model allowing administrations to 
work together while minimizing the risks to 
individual privacy had to be devised.  
Should all citizens’ data be centralized in a 
single government database? This was a project 
that was born in France in the 1970s. The 
“SAFARI” project consisted in creating a large 
database called “Automated System for 
Administrative Files and the Directory of 
Individuals”, in which all the citizens’ data 
necessary for the functioning of the 
administrations would be grouped together. One 
of the main concerns of this project was the high 
risk of data piracy facilitated by the fact that all 
data would have been available at a single point. 
Therefore, it was abandoned3. 
In the 1990s, Belgium opted for another 
model to effectively implement the exchange of 
information between administrations. This 
unprecedented model is based on the 
decentralisation of data among separate 
administrations, and on the creation of networks 
of administrations collaborating with each other. 
Specifically, networks of administrations in 
 
2 See Law of 5 May 2014 “guaranteeing the principle of 
single data collection in the operation of the services and 
bodies that come under or perform certain tasks for the 
authority and simplifying and harmonizing electronic and 
paper forms”, accessible here: https://www.ejustice.just.-
fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=20140
50506&table_name=loi. 
3 For more information on this subject, see 
https://www.senat.fr/evenement/archives/D45/context.html. 
which a service integrator ensures the exchange 
of data between the administrations concerned.  
The networked-government model was an 
early incarnation of the concept of “privacy by 
design”, one of the important principles of the 
GDPR4, which calls for privacy to be taken into 
account at the design stage of the tool. It is 
exactly this concern for privacy in the 
architecture of the administration model that led 
to the choice to organize administration in 
networks and to abandon the centralized data 
model. 
2.2. The Belgian model of networked 
administrations 
How exactly does this model work in 
practice? First, administrations with something in 
common (for example, a common work object or 
membership of the same entity) are grouped 
together in a set called a “network”.  
Then, different administrations are assigned 
the responsibility of collecting, recording and 
updating specific data. The databases containing 
this information, each under the responsibility of 
an administration, are called “authentic data 
sources”. The idea is to ensure that each piece of 
information relating to the citizen is recorded 
only once by a single administration of the 
network, which is then responsible for the 
reliability of this data.  
Finally, a new type of tool is placed at the 
heart of this network of administrations: the 
service integrator, also known as an “information 
exchange platform” or “crossroads bank”. In 
short, the service integrator is a technical 
infrastructure, placed at the heart of a network of 
administrations, and which is responsible for 
ensuring, within this network, the electronic 
exchange of information from various authentic 
sources. For example, when an administration 
needs data that it does not have, it simply 
contacts the service integrator, which in turn 
contacts the administration holding the required 
data and then forwards it to the administration 
that requested it5. 
In order to facilitate the understanding of this 
paper, the model of a network of administrations 
including a service integrator can be schematized 
as follows. 
 
4 Art. 26 GDPR. 
5 For further developments on e-government and the 
networked government model, see D. De Bot, 
Privacybeschermingbij e-government in België. 
Eenkritische analyse van het Rijksregister, de 
Kruispuntbank van Ondernemingenen de elektronische 
identiteitskaartals belangrijkste juridischebouwstenen, 
Brugge, VandenBroele, 2005, 1-13; E. Degrave, L’e-
gouvernement et la protection de la vie privée. Légalité, 
transparence et contrôle, Brussels, Larcier, 2014, in 
particular 172 ff.  
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Diagram illustrating a network of 
administrations made up of a service integrator 
to which several administrations are linked, 
some of which hold an authentic source of data. 
In concrete terms, there are several networks 
of administrations in Belgium, concerning 
health, social security, tax, vehicles, etc. In the 
following lines, we focus on the social security 
network whose service integrator is called the 
“Crossroads Bank for Social Security”. 
 
 
Diagram of the social security network, with 
the Crossroads Bank for Social Security at its 
heart. 
3. OASIS to combat social fraud 
This e-government model makes possible 
new operations within the public sector based on 
the re-use of citizens’ personal data.  
The administration can thus automatically 
grant certain benefits to those entitled to them6.  
It can also exercise more control over 
citizens. The fight against social fraud is a very 
telling example of this phenomenon, made 
possible by the use of a “data warehouse” called 
“OASIS” to which the data matching and data 
mining techniques are applied. 
3.1. Data warehouse, data matching and data 
mining 
To reinforce the fight against social law fraud, 
the Belgian administration has created a “data 
 
6 For more information on this topic, see E. Degrave, L’e-
gouvernementet la protection de la vie privée. Légalité, 
transparence et contrôle, 33 et seq. 
warehouse” called “OASIS”, namely 
“Organisation Anti-fraude des Services 
d’Inspection Sociale”. This is a large database 
containing a large amount of data on companies 
and individuals, so that social fraud can be 
effectively identified. 
This system has been operational since 20057.  
After analysing the content of the OASIS 
“data warehouse”, social profiling will now be 
studied.  
3.1.1. The OASIS “data warehouse” 
As a “data warehouse”, OASIS is a special 
database, which is characterised mainly by the 
fact that it contains a considerable amount of 
information, organised according to a certain 
logic, which makes it possible to carry out 
complex searches on the basis of that 
information.  
OASIS contains mainly data on employers 
and workers of certain sectors of activity, such as 
the construction sector and the hotel and catering 
industry. These data come from a number of 
different databases held by the government. 
These include tax data, social security data, 
pension data, ... Recently, OASIS also contains 
data provided by energy suppliers (gas, water 
and electricity) about their customers8. 
 
OASIS “Datawarehouse” and some databases 
that provide data to OASIS. 
3.1.2. Data mining and data matching 
Before the use of OASIS, people suspected of 
social fraud were identified by social inspectors 
based on their knowledge of social fraud. They 
described the type of fraudster sought to the 
computer specialists in order to establish certain 
computer links between the files held by the 
administrations concerned.  
The weakness of this system was linked to the 
fact that, at one point, the social inspectors had 
provided all their knowledge without, however, 
all the frauds having been discovered. Their 
work also depended on the complaints of 
workers, who over time, due to legislative 
changes, were less and less numerous. 
Today, these human limits are being 
surpassed thanks to the powerful calculations 
carried out by OASIS, which allow more 
potential fraudsters to be identified.  
 
7 Analytic Report of the Social Affairs Committee, Doc. 
Parl., sess. 2004-2005, COM 541, 19. 
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 OASIS is used to perform profiling 
operations, i.e., subjecting an individual’s data to 
a calculation software that is capable of 
performing statistical comparisons and 
correlations. Depending on the result of these 
calculations, the individual is attached to a 
predetermined category of the population, which 
presents specific characteristics justifying a 
particular attitude, such as, in the case of OASIS, 
an inspection for suspected social fraudsters9. 
In concrete terms, this profiling operation is 
carried out by means of data matching and data 
mining operations.  
Data matching consists in comparing data. A 
number of alarms are applied to the data 
recorded in OASIS. These alarms are fraud 
detection algorithms relating some specific data 
to each other.  
Once the data matching operation is 
completed, the data mining operation is 
performed. This operation is at the heart of the 
concept of profiling, which the Council of 
Europe defines as “an automated data processing 
technique that consists in applying a ‘profile’ - 
that is, a set of data that characterises a category 
of individuals - to a natural person, in particular 
in order to take decisions about him or her or to 
analyse or predict his or her personal 
preferences, behaviour and attitudes”10. 
Let us take an example which, for the sake of 
clarity of this paper, oversimplifies this very 
complex technique. John is 30 years old and is a 
researcher at the University. His tax data show 
that he earns an average salary. Statistically, he 
should be in the category of citizens with a small 
car and a modest home. However, the vehicle 
data shows that John drives a new Ferrari. The 
National Register indicates that his home is 
located in a wealthy city, and tax data shows that 
the property tax on his home is high. Is John 
guilty of social or tax fraud? In any case, 
suspicion is the order of the day. John falls into 
the category of presumed tax and social 
fraudsters and a tax and/or social audit will be 
 
9 M. Hildebrandt, Who is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility, 
in Reinventing Data Protection?, S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. 
De Hert, C. de Terwangne, and S. Nouwt (eds.), Dordrecht, 
Springer, 2009, 241; V. Papakonstantinou, A Data 
Protection Approach to Data Matching Operations Among 
Public Bodies, in International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, vol. 9, n. 1,2001, 62-63; J.-M. 
Dinant, C. Lazaro, Y. Poullet, N. Lefever and A. Rouvroy 
(eds.), L’application de la Convention 108 au mécanisme de 
profilage. Eléments de réflexion destinés au travail futur du 
Comité consultatif (T-Pd), Strasbourg, publication of the 
Comité consultatif de la Convention pour la protection des 
personnes a l’egard du traitement automatisedes donnees a 
caractere personnel, 2008, 5. 
10 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)13 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on the 
protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data in the context of profiling, 
available at www.coe.int. 
encouraged. 
In other words, by performing data mining, 
one connects an individual to a particular 
person’s profile, based on the data that has been 
analysed about him or her. In this case, the fact 
that an alarm is triggered at the time of the data 
cross-referencing results in the individual being 
linked to the profile of the alleged fraudster for 
the type of fraud targeted by the alarm. 
Therefore, the data matching and data mining 
operations make it possible to identify 
individuals who are potential fraudsters.  
Once identified, the identity of the natural or 
legal person is communicated to the social 
inspection services. The latter will then carry out 
a control on the persons concerned. 
OASIS is therefore an administrative decision 
support tool, but it does not take the decision to 
establish and punish fraud by itself. It is 
therefore not possible, at present, to challenge 
the decisions taken by OASIS. Nonetheless, in 
our opinion, OASIS takes important decisions in 
the functioning of the administration. For 
example, classifying a person as a “potential 
fraudster” is a decision taken by an algorithm, 
which then strongly influences the 
administration’s decision to identify and, if 
necessary, punish a fraud. This set of elements 
raises questions and requires the OASIS tool to 
be precisely framed11.  
3.2. Applications 
As has been said, OASIS is used to fight 
social legislation fraud. There are several 
applications of this tool12. Two of them are 
identified in this study.  
OASIS is used to combat fraudulent labour 
providers and bankruptcies13. These are 
companies that hire many workers, declare each 
worker but do not pay the social security charges 
relating to them to the National Social Security 
Office (NSSO). By the time the NSSO realises 
this and decides to carry out an inspection, the 
workers concerned are moved - often in large 
numbers - to another company, which repeats the 
same type of fraud. In OASIS, a first alarm 
makes it possible to detect the mass arrival of 
these workers who will be declared but for whom 
the employer will not pay social security 
contributions, and a second alarm makes it 
possible to show that as of the arrival of these 
workers, debts towards the NSSO have arisen. 
In addition, since 2016, OASIS has been used 
to fight against the domicile fraud, also called 
 
11 See below. 
12 These applications are explained here: https://www.ksz-
bcss.fgov.be/fr/services-et-support/services/lutte-contre-la-
fraude. 
13 E. Degrave, L’e-gouvernement et la protection de la vie 
privée. Légalité, transparence et contrôle, 44. 
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 fictitious domicile14. In this situation, one person 
declares a family situation or a domicile that 
does not correspond to reality in order to receive 
more social assistance than he or she is entitled 
to. It is therefore mainly the poorest people who 
are targeted by this use of OASIS. For example, 
a man receives unemployment benefit. He lives 
alone in an apartment, which enables him to 
receive a higher unemployment benefit than if he 
declared living as a couple. In reality, he lives 
with his partner. This is a fictitious domicile. To 
fight against this type of fraud, the administration 
relies on data sent by energy suppliers (gas, 
electricity, water). They are legally obliged to 
send the data of customers, whose private 
consumption deviates by at least 80 per cent up 
or down from an average consumption 
depending on the officially communicated 
household composition, to the Crossroads Bank 
for Social Security, which manages OASIS15. 
Then, the data matching operation begins: among 
these clients, the beneficiaries of social benefits 
are identified on the basis of their other data held 
by the administration. The data mining operation 
follows: the fact of being identified as a 
beneficiary of a social allowance, with an 
abnormally low or high energy consumption, 
leads to linking the person to the profile of the 
alleged fraudster and triggers an alarm indicating 
that the person must be monitored by a social 
inspector. 
3.3. Poor law and hidden information 
3.3.1. A very late and poor quality legal 
framework 
OASIS has been operational since 2004. 
Although it constitutes a significant interference 
in the private life of citizens, since it processes a 
large amount of data relating to many of them, it 
was not regulated by any law between 2004 and 
2018. In a particularly dense law of 5 September 
2018, the Belgian legislator discreetly slipped a 
provision16 that seems to be intended to frame 
OASIS, without explicitly mentioning it.  
 
14 See the Law of 13 May 2016 amending the programme 
Law (I) of 29 March 2012 concerning the control of the 
abuse of fictitious addresses by recipients of social benefits, 
with a view to introducing the systematic transmission of 
certain consumption data from distribution companies and 
distribution network operators to the BCSS improving data 
mining and data matching in the fight against social fraud 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/loi/loi.htm. 
15 Article 2 of the aforementioned Law of 13 May 2016. 
16 Article 12 of the Law of 5 September 2018 establishing 
the Information Security Committee and amending various 
laws concerning the implementation of Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, accessible 
here: https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.-
pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2018090501&table_name=loi. 
This provision is formulated in an unclear and 
very broad manner. In short, the law authorises 
the collection of all personal data for fraud 
prevention purposes.  
Indeed, it can be inferred from the law that a 
large number of public institutions (e.g. all social 
security institutions and social inspection 
services) can collect a lot of data (i.e. “all data 
necessary for the purposes of the enforcement of 
legislation concerning labour and social security 
law”) and make extensive use of them (“collect, 
process and aggregate them in a “data 
warehouse” enabling them to carry out data 
mining and data matching operations, including 
profiling within the meaning of Article 4, 4) of 
the General Data Protection Regulation). The 
purposes mentioned by the text are also very 
numerous (“the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of 
offences against social regulations (...), and the 
collection and recovery of the amounts falling 
within their respective powers”). 
3.3.2. Access to information is almost 
impossible 
In addition to the fact that the law is of poor 
quality and does not provide the necessary 
information on how OASIS works in practice, 
when trying to understand how OASIS works in 
practice, it is particularly burdensome to access 
public information about this tool. In short, 
information about OASIS seems to be hidden.  
Initially, while studying the decisions of the 
Belgian data protection authority, by chance we 
found some trace of the name “OASIS” for the 
first time. We then wanted to know more. The 
task was so tedious that we felt like an 
investigative journalist. In exercising our right to 
access administrative documents with a public 
authority involved in setting up OASIS, we were 
unable to gain access to official documents on 
this subject, on the grounds that the document 
could be a “source of misunderstanding”17 within 
the meaning of the law on the publicity of the 
administration. After having appealed to the 
Commission for Access to Administrative 
Documents, the Commission replied that the 
authority addressed was not an administrative 
one and that the requirements of transparency did 
not therefore apply18.  
When we spoke to officials in the 
administrations, we received several replies 
 
17 Letter from the President of the Sectoral Social Security 
Committee dated 11 August 2011. 
18 Committee on Access to and Re-use of Administrative 
Documents, Opinion No. 2011-309 of 10 October 2011, on 
the refusal to grant access to documents which have been 
used by the Sectoral Committee on Social Security and 
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 explaining that either one department was not 
competent, or that they did not know the matter, 
or that the file was transferred to this or that 
department. We had to rely on the cooperation of 
two administrative officers who agreed to give us 
information in confidence to understand what it 
was all about.  
Having made new access requests since the 
publication of the law of 5 September 2018, we 
cannot help but notice that the situation has not 
changed. We are either directed to information 
that is not related to OASIS19, or sent from one 
administration to another. 
In the end, to date, we have not been able to 
access an official document clearly explaining 
this tool. All we have found as public 
information is a web page, hosted on the website 
of the Crossroads Bank for Social Security, 
which explains in a very enthusiastic and 
synthetic way the effectiveness of OASIS in the 
fight against fraud. However, we still have no 
explanation of the essential elements on which 
OASIS is based, such as an exhaustive list of the 
data aggregated in the “data warehouse”, a clear 
list of the purposes pursued, the algorithms used, 
an explanation of the types of alarm, etc. 
3.4. Violation of several fundamental rights 
The fact that the legislation surrounding 
OASIS is of poor quality and that accessing 
information about this tool is very difficult if not 
impossible, constitutes a violation of the 
protection of citizens’ privacy and also threatens 
other fundamental rights.  
3.4.1. A violation of the fundamental right to 
privacy 
During the preparatory works for the law of 5 
September 2018, the Data Protection Authority20 
was very critical. Among other things, it argued 
that the law was not sufficiently clear, in 
particular with regard to the purposes, 
formulated in a “broad and comprehensive” 
manner that “offers (...) very few points of 
reference for the subject whose data are to be 
found in the “data warehouse(s)”. Neither Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereafter ECHR), nor Article 22 of the 
Constitution, nor the GDPR, in particular 
Articles 6.3 and 22, authorise such a ‘blank 
cheque’21.  
The legislative section of the Council of State 
had also issued a very critical opinion on this 
 
19 For example, on 7th July 2020, the Crossroads Bank for 
Social Security referred us to this website: https://www.ksz-
bcss.fgov.be/fr/dwh/homepage/index.html. 
20 Formerly known as the “Commission de la protection de 
la vie privée”. 
21 CPVP, Opinion No. 34/2018, No. 29 available here: 
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/privacycom
mission/files/documents/avis_34_2018_0.pdf 
law, stressing in particular that “the creation of a 
“data warehouse” processing a large number of 
data and concerning a large part, if not all, of the 
citizens and possibly using profiling techniques 
cannot be considered as insignificant”, which is 
why the legislator must precisely determine the 
essential elements of these data processing 
operations22. 
The text had then been slightly modified, 
notably by integrating a summary definition of 
the terms “data matching” and “data mining”, but 
without making any real improvements to the 
text.  
Today, the situation remains worrying. 
Among other criticisms, OASIS is a clear 
intrusion into the privacy of citizens. It gathers a 
large amount of citizens’ personal data from 
multiple government databases.  
This information was initially collected by the 
administrations for the performance of specific 
legal tasks, such as the payment of allowances to 
beneficiaries, and not for the purpose of profiling 
them. Therefore, OASIS re-uses data for a 
different control purpose from the one pursued 
when the information was collected, without 
informing the data subjects.  
Furthermore, data mining is a powerful data 
processing operation which inherently presents 
dangers, especially when a general profile is 
erroneously attributed to a particular person.  
Moreover, OASIS is, of course, a tool 
supporting the administrative decision-making 
which does not take the decision itself to 
establish and sanction a fraud. Nevertheless, 
attributing the qualification of “potential 
fraudster” to a person is, in our opinion, a 
decision taken by an algorithm, which then 
strongly influences the administration’s decision 
to detect and, if necessary, sanction a fraud. This 
set of elements raises questions with respect to 
the GDPR23, which prohibits fully automated 
decision making.  
In view of these flaws and the vagueness of 
the legal provision that is supposed to govern 
OASIS, the current situation is, in our view, 
contrary to the GDPR but also to the Belgian 
Constitution. Indeed, in Belgium, the protection 
of privacy is a fundamental right enshrined in 
Article 22 of the Constitution. This right is also 
enshrined in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It follows from 
the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights24, the Constitutional Court and the 
 
22 Legislative section of the Council of State, Opinion No. 
63.202/2 of 26th April 2018, Doc. Parl, Ch. repr., session 
2017-2018, Doc 54 3185/001, p. 138 accessible here: 
https://www.lachambre.be/doc/FLWB/pdf/54/3185/54K318
5001.pdf. 
23 Art. 22 GDPR. See below. 
24 See Coureur D.H., Rotaru v. Romania judgment, 4 May 
2000, Req. 28341/95, § 57. 
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 Council of State25 that the legislator is obliged to 
determine the “essential elements” of data 
processing in a clear and precise manner. In 
other words, the law must be irreproachable in 
terms of its content. 
In this case, this means that the law governing 
OASIS must be sufficiently clear, so that the 
citizen can know, by reading the law, what is 
going to happen to the data he or she entrusts to 
the state. The law must therefore set out 
precisely the essential elements of the 
interference, i.e., the guidelines governing the 
use of OASIS (purposes of the data processing 
implemented, data used, recipients of the data, 
obligation to inform subjects of this use of their 
data, control of the tool, etc.). These elements are 
not currently found in the law26. 
Article 22 of the Constitution also requires 
the adoption of a law in the formal sense of the 
term, in order to interfere in the private life of 
citizens. The need for a formal law is meant to 
stimulate the democratic debate and to reflect on 
how the delicate balance between administrative 
efficiency and privacy can be achieved in the use 
of OASIS. However, in the case of OASIS, this 
debate has not taken place. The legal provision 
that was supposed to govern OASIS was 
included in a very long “catch-all” law, drafted 
just before the summer, in very technical 
language, so that the issues behind it did not 
receive sufficient attention from MPs and were 
not debated. The result is a technical provision, 
designed by technicians, aimed more at 
administrative efficiency than at respecting the 
fundamental rights of citizens. Therefore, OASIS 
is a tool that to this day remains largely unknown 
to the public but also to the leaders of our 
country. 
Finally, we must unfortunately note that the 
protection of privacy, cleverly put in place by the 
networked administration model27, is destroyed 
by this data warehouse which gathers in a single 
point initially decentralized data, and allows all 
possible reuses to achieve the very broad purpose 
of the fight against fraud. 
3.4.2. Secret algorithms maybe discriminatory 
There’s more. In addition to the violation of 
privacy and personal data protection, the OASIS 
tool also raises questions with regard to other 
fundamental rights. These include equality and 
discrimination. Given the limited public 
 
25 See. E. Degrave, L’e-gouvernementet la protection de la 
vie privée. Légalité, transparence et contrôle, 103 and 
references cited. 
26 In the same sense, see. Commission de la protection de la 




27 See above. 
information available about OASIS, combined 
with the fact that it is currently not possible to 
access administrative documents that would 
allow one to understand how OASIS works, the 
algorithms used in the data matching and data 
mining remain secret and therefore impossible to 
control.  
However, it would be very useful to be able 
to analyse these algorithms to check, for 
example, that they are not affected by 
algorithmic, racist, sexist or “anti-poor” biases. 
Indeed, we know that algorithms are not neutral. 
They are the result of decisions made by 
algorithm developers who, consciously or 
unconsciously, make choices28. However, these 
human choices can indirectly orient the 
algorithm, and therefore the decision taken on 
the basis of the algorithm, in favour or against 
certain categories of people. This is called 
“algorithmic bias”: the algorithm is not neutral 
and therefore leads to an oriented decision. This 
biased decision may, for example, be more in 
favour of white-skinned people than black-
skinned people, richer than poor, men than 
women. There is therefore a risk that using secret 
algorithms to make public decisions may lead to 
“automating inequalities”29 at the societal level.  
In this case, nothing is known about OASIS 
algorithms. It cannot be ruled out that the 
profiling implemented in the fight against social 
fraud primarily targets certain populations and 
neighbourhoods, thus leading to serious 
discrimination. This situation is very worrying 
and unacceptable in a state governed by the rule 
of law. 
3.4.3. The power of decision delegated to 
algorithms 
A computer tool alone cannot make an 
administrative decision. Indeed, Article 33 of the 
Belgian Constitution states “All powers emanate 
from the Nation. They shall be exercised in the 
manner laid down by the Constitution”.  
From this follows the principle of the 
unavailability of powers, according to which the 
administrative authority must itself carry out the 
tasks legally assigned to it, effectively exercising 
its discretionary power. 
Giving decision-making power to algorithms 
would be contrary to the principle of 
unavailability of powers enshrined in Article 33 
of the Constitution. It would be similar to 
delegating competence to a computer tool.  
For example, the Council of State has already 
been seized of several appeals concerning the use 
 
28 About that, see C. O’Neill, Weapons of Math 
Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy, USA, Crown Books, 2016. 
29 V. Eubanks, Automating inequality. How high-tech tools 
profile, police and punish the poor, New York, St Martin’s 
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 of a computer tool in the context of the award of 
a public contract. The administrative authority is 
accused of not being able to explain its choice, 
which is too largely dictated by the calculations 
made by the computer30.  
In the present case, the administration could 
not therefore let OASIS decide on a sanction 
related to the person suspected of fraud through 
its algorithms. An algorithm does not understand 
reality and therefore could not itself adopt a 
decision and give reasons for that decision.  
For this reason, the identification of a 
possible fraud by OASIS must be followed by an 
on-site inspection and it is during this inspection 
that the reality of the fraud will be verified. In 
the event of fraud, the penalty will be imposed 
by the administration on the basis of the grounds 
identified by the inspectors.  
However, between the identification of the 
possible fraudster and the on-site inspection, 
there is, in our view, an intermediate 
administrative decision that is adopted: the 
decision to carry out an on-site check. This 
decision is based largely on a tool that the social 
inspectors themselves do not understand since 
they do not understand how OASIS identifies 
potential fraudsters. Therefore, one may wonder 
whether the administrative decision to sanction a 
fraud is, in part, the result of a delegation of 
competence to an algorithm, which would be 
unconstitutional.  
This issue, which has not yet been resolved to 
date, is related to Article 22 of the GDPR, which 
prohibits fully automated decisions. The 
identification of a potential fraudster is an 
essential part of the process that will lead to the 
sanctioning of an individual. Without this 
identification, there can be no control and 
without control, there can be no sanction. At 
present, this identification is carried out in a fully 
automated manner, by OASIS, and in a 
completely opaque manner given the lack of 
accessible information about this tool. Should 
not the importance of this automated and opaque 
operation in the process of sanctioning a fraud 
lead to the recognition that the decision to 
sanction a fraud is contrary to Article 22 of the 
GDPR? This is a question that is still pending at 
this stage of our research. 
4. Towards a reconsideration of OASIS at the 
start of the SYRI case? 
Recently, a very interesting case has arisen in 
the Netherlands concerning a tool that has many 
similarities with OASIS.  
 
30 See C.E., 16th September 2004, Computer Sciences, n. 
134.986; C.E., 7 March 2006, SA Construction industrielles 
de la méditerranée et alii, n. 155.931; C.E., 8th June 2006, 
NV Eurosense Belfotop, n. 159.782; C.E., 27th December 
2006, N.V. Bioterra et alii, n. 166.318. 
4.1. The SYRI tool 
The SYRI tool, namely System of Risk 
Indicator, is under the responsibility of the Dutch 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Just 
like OASIS, it is an automated system for 
monitoring social fraud. A data matching 
operation gathers 17 categories of data (tax data, 
pension data, social assistance data, etc.). These 
are then subjected to the data mining technique 
to identify citizens who are suspected of fraud. 
Each individual or legal entity suspected of fraud 
is given a score that corresponds to a risk 
notification.  
Like OASIS, this system was first created and 
used outside any legal framework31. Initially, the 
Dutch press caused a scandal by revealing that 
Bulgarian gangs had been committing social 
fraud for many years. When they arrived in the 
Netherlands, they registered as residents, opened 
a bank account and applied for social assistance. 
They then returned to Bulgaria, continuing to 
receive social benefits for years. SYRI was 
created to make the fight against this type of 
fraud more effective32. In 2014, the legislator 
gave the tool a legal basis. SYRI is governed by 
articles 64 and 65 of the law Structuur 
uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen and 
chapter 5, letter a), of its implementing decree. 
4.1.1. Reactions and legal action 
As soon as it was set up, SYRI aroused a lot 
of reactions. The Council of State and the Data 
Protection Authority highlight the fact that SYRI 
violates the protection of citizens’ privacy, in 
particular because the purpose of the tool is too 
broad, the principle of data minimization is not 
respected, and data are reused for purposes 
incompatible with those of their initial 
collection33. In addition, NGOs point out the risk 
that the algorithms used may be subject to 
discriminatory bias, based on a survey showing 
that SYRI is used mainly in poor 
neighbourhoods or neighbourhoods with a high 
percentage of migrants34. 
These NGOs, as well as experts and 
journalists, then filed a lawsuit before the District 
Court of The Hague35. The plaintiffs based their 
 
31 See the intervention in this case by Philip Alston, United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights, “Brief by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights as Amicus Curiae in the 
case of NJCM c.s./De Staat der Nederlanden (SyRI) before 
the District Court of The Hague (case number: 
C/09/550982/ HA ZA 18/388)” available here: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/Amicusfi
nalversionsigned.pdf. 
32 Society for Comparative Legislation, Netherlands Report, 
9, available here: https://www.legiscompare.fr/web/Ac-
tivites-de-la-section-921. 
33 Ibidem, 11 and 12. 
34 Ibidem,14. 
35 The applicants’ submissions are available here: 
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 action on two grounds. On the one hand, SYRI 
violates the legal regime for the protection of 
privacy and, in particular, Article 8 §2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, Article 17 of the United 
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Articles 5, 6, 13, 14, 22 and/or 28 of the 
GDPR36. On the other hand, SYRI violates the 
right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair 
trial as guaranteed by Articles 6 and 13 of the 
Convention, Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union37. 
4.1.2. The judgment of the District Court of 
The Hague 
The Court delivered its judgment on 5 
February 202038. In this judgment, the court 
measures SYRI mainly against Article 8 §2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  
First of all, the court recognises that SYRI 
pursues a legitimate objective, namely the 
economic well-being of the country. “Social 
security is one of the pillars of the Dutch society 
and contributes significantly to the prosperity of 
the Netherlands” and “new technologies - 
including digital options for linking files and 
analysing data using algorithms - (...) must be 
used to prevent and combat fraud”39. 
The Court then points out that SYRI 
constitutes an organised interference with the 
privacy of citizens, which is extensive and 
serious, particularly in view of the “very large 
category of data processed”, the lack of 
transparency as to the model and risk indicators 
used, and the lack of information of the data 
subjects40. The United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Extreme 
Poverty, Philip Aston, explained it very well in 
his third intervention in this case. He explained 
that “the essence of the right to privacy is at 
stake here. Entire neighbourhoods are deemed 
suspicious and are subject to special scrutiny, 
which is the digital equivalent of fraud inspectors 
knocking on every door in a certain area and 
examining the files of every individual in an 
attempt to identify cases of fraud (…). In the real 
world, there would never be enough fraud 
inspectors to undertake such an exercise and the 
general public would quickly resist and protest 
against such invasions of their privacy. The fact 





36 See the above conclusions, 5 ff. 
37 See the above conclusions, 11 et seq. 
38 The ruling is available here: https://uitspraken.recht-
spraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:865. 
39 The above-mentioned ruling, n. 6.3 and 6.4. 
40 Ibidem, n. 6.65. 
the real world is just a little solace, however, for 
those affected by it. The psychological and other 
effects of a physical raid on a neighbourhood by 
fraud inspectors is relatively easy to imagine, but 
a digital raid of such magnitude leaves equally 
problematic traces. The fact that SYRI operates 
in relative silence and is de facto invisible to the 
naked eye may in fact increase the discomfort 
and harm suffered by people living in these 
neighbourhoods”41. 
According to the Court, this interference is 
disproportionate to the objective pursued by 
SYRI. Indeed, “the SYRI legislation (...) does 
not respect the fair balance required for a 
justified interference within the meaning of 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR”42. 
The Court relies on the fact that the law does 
not provide sufficient guarantees for the citizen 
by failing to respect the fundamental principles 
of privacy and personal data protection, namely 
transparency, purpose limitation and data 
minimisation43. Among other things, the fact that 
“the SYRI legislation does not provide 
information on the functioning of the risk model, 
for example, on the type of algorithms used in 
the risk model”44 makes it “difficult to see how a 
data subject can defend himself against the fact 
that a risk report has been drawn up for him”45.  
The tribunal also added that this lack of 
transparency is problematic because, while risk 
analysis is useful, it can lead to “discriminatory 
(unintended) effects”46. However, under the 
current SYRI legislation, “it is not possible to 
assess whether this risk has been sufficiently 
mitigated due to a lack of verifiable knowledge 
about risk indicators and the (operation of the) 
risk model”47. 
Consequently, the court decided that Article 
65 of the law Structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie 
werk en inkomen (SUWI) and chapter 5, letter a), 
of its implementing decree have no binding 
effect on the claimants.  
The effect of this decision is the immediate 
cessation of the use of SYRI. 
4.1.3. Will the “SYRI case” inspire an 
“OASIS case”? 
The decision of the District Court of The 
Hague states, very usefully, that even if the 
 
41 P. Alston, Brief by the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on extreme poverty and human rights as Amicus Curiae in 
the case of NJCM c.s./De Staat der Nederlanden (SyRI) 
before the District Court of The Hague (case number: 
C/09/550982/ HA ZA 18/388), n. 29, available here: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/Amicusfi
nalversionsigned.pdf. 
42 Ibidem, n. 6.83. 
43 Ibidem, n. 6.86. 
44 Ibidem, n. 6.89. 
45 Ibidem, n. 6.90. 
46 Ibidem, n. 6.91.  
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 technological tools have a legitimate purpose, 
they must respect the fundamental rights of 
citizens. In particular, even if powerful anti-fraud 
systems pursue a legitimate interest in a State 
governed by the rule of law, they must respect 
the rules of privacy and personal data protection 
so as not to upset the subtle balance between 
administrative efficiency and protection of 
citizens’ freedoms.  
The fundamental principles of data protection, 
enshrined in the GDPR, must therefore be 
respected. In particular, every citizen should be 
able to know, and understand, what will happen 
to the data he or she entrusts to the State, thanks 
to a clear knowledge of the data used and the 
purposes pursued.  
However, and this is a remarkable point of 
this judgment, the court is not content with 
simply ensuring the protection of personal data 
as defined by the GDPR. This decision is also a 
step forward for the transparency of the 
algorithms. Indeed, this decision clearly 
underlines that the secret nature of the risk 
models, risk indicators and types of algorithms 
used in the fight against fraud violates the 
fundamental requirement of transparency 
imposed by Article 8(2) of the ECHR, even 
though this information does not, in itself, 
constitute personal data. This link is very 
interesting at a time when it is regrettable that the 
GDPR has limited the notion of “data” to 
“personal data”, thus preventing the protection of 
individuals from the impact of algorithms used in 
State decisions. The court also highlights the 
need for the legislator who sets up such computer 
systems to ensure that algorithmic biases, and 
thus the risks of discrimination, are eradicated or 
at least minimized. This is a first step towards the 
possibility of challenging, in court, the opacity of 
algorithms. It is to be hoped that, in the near 
future, it will be possible to challenge directly 
the algorithms used by public authorities, 
without having to appeal the administrative 
decisions resulting from them48.  
The similarities between OASIS and SYRI 
are obvious. It is to be hoped that the lessons 
learned from this remarkable decision will 
inspire a review of the OASIS tool in Belgium. 
5. Conclusions 
Whether it is to lighten the administrative 
burden, to combat fraud or to grant allowances to 
those who are entitled to them, digital tools must 
be used to achieve administrative efficiency. 
However, the efficiency of public authorities 
 
48 In this sense, G. Lewkovitch, Les outils d’intelligence 
artificielle contre les droits de l’homme: l’affaire NJCM 




cannot ignore fundamental rights, otherwise 
confidence in the State in general, and digital 
administration in particular, will be undermined.  
In Belgium, the e-government model was 
developed from the outset, taking into account 
both the need for efficiency and the protection of 
citizens’ freedoms. This model gives concrete 
expression to the idea of “privacy by design” 
well before its affirmation by the GDPR.  
Unfortunately, since then, new tools have 
appeared within the administration that do not 
take sufficient account of this delicate balance. 
This is the case, for example, with the OASIS 
tool. The privacy protection made possible by the 
decentralisation of data seems to be undermined 
by the fact that this tool uses a lot of data to fight 
fraud, aggregates it in a data warehouse, 
processes it for unclear purposes. The law being 
unclear, and the scarcity or non-existence of 
public IT on this subject makes OASIS an 
algorithmic black box. This black box is, for the 
moment, uncontrollable. Thus, are the algorithms 
used by OASIS not affected by bias, which 
would lead the administration to target poor 
categories of the population as a priority?  
Such uncertainty surrounding the use of 
citizens’ personal data is not acceptable in a state 
governed by the rule of law, as it violates Article 
8 §2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and, in Belgium, Article 22 of the 
Constitution.  
This situation risks gradually undermining the 
citizen’s confidence in the State. However, this 
confidence is essential in terms of digital 
administration. Without it, citizens will no longer 
agree to entrust their data to the State and will no 
longer support new digital practices in the future. 
The European Court of Human Rights has 
already affirmed this, stating that “any state 
which claims a pioneering role in the 
development of new technologies bears a 
particular responsibility to strike the right 
balance in this area”, by carefully weighing “the 
advantages which may result from the extensive 
use of these technologies against the essential 
interests of the protection of privacy”49. In the 
same sense, in Belgium, the Council of State has 
stressed the “serious breach of public 
confidence” with regard to illegal data 
processing carried out within the administration.  
Ultimately, the reactions provoked by the use 
of technology by the State are a reminder that 
progress in the digital world can only be made if 
the relationship between the State and citizens is 
conceived as a partnership based on mutual trust. 
This trust cannot be imposed by binding 
legislation. It must be inspired by respect, in this 
 
49 ECHR, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, 4th 
December 2018, Applications N. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 
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 new context, for the founding pillars of the rule 
of law.  
Thus, digital technology challenges the State 
to respect legality, transparency and control.  
With regard to legality, even if the digital 
tools are technical, their implementation cannot 
do without a democratic debate on the necessary 
balance between administrative efficiency and 
the protection of citizens’ rights. It is not up to 
the administration to find this balance, but to the 
legislator to define it after a thorough democratic 
debate in order to define solutions that are in line 
with the values of society as a whole. Without 
this legality, it is also the legitimacy of state 
action that will be affected. 
The principle of transparency requires that 
the digital tools used by the State should be 
known to the public, as the SYRI case has again 
reminded us. We cannot win the confidence of 
citizens by keeping them in ignorance. These 
tools must be known, but they must also be 
understandable. Transparency in the digital 
world requires the State to make a special 
educational effort to enable everyone to 
understand what will happen to the data they 
entrust to the State. 
Finally, these digital tools must be able to be 
controlled, not only by the judiciary but also by 
anyone interested in them. This is particularly 
important at a time when more and more 
algorithms are being used, which may contain 
discriminatory biases. 

